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1·The paper presents Stackelberg games for the systems with coupling control variable.

文章讨论了控制变量耦合的受限系统的主从对策问题。

2·It illustrated that it was difficult to turn cooperation into fact in a simple game and Stackelberg model was close to the fact.

说明了真假合作在一次博弈中很难实现，斯塔克博格模型的产量决策更接近现实。

3·Introduces two kinds of Cournot models under complete and incomplete information of game theory, and its extension Stackelberg model.

介绍了博弈理论的完全信息和不完全信息下的两个古诺模型，以及它的推广—斯塔克博格的寡头竞争模型。

4·Under the worst demand scenarios of B2B e-markets, the strategies of stackelberg game in which seller is the leader and buyer is follower are studied.

在B2B在线市场最坏需求情景下，研究了卖方作为主方、买方作为从方的主从对策模型。

5·The Bertrand-Stackelberg equilibrium profit, which is not stable in the multi-round model, will eventually come close to Bertrand-Nash equilibrium profit.

但在多轮博弈的模型中伯川德-施塔贝格均衡点并不稳定，最终会趋向于伯川德-纳什均衡点。

6·To solve the problem of inequality existing in Server, Agents and Users, Stackelberg strategy model for the systems is established, which is a three-level programming model.

在此基础上，同时考虑了乘客与客运部门两方面的利益，构造了一个三层规划模型以得到在市场竞争条件下制定客运价格的优化策略模型。

7·The results show that the more the intensity of advertising competition between the two downstream retailers, the more the retailers advertise on local advertising in Stackelberg game.

同时，斯坦博格和合作博弈下零售商的地方性广告投入和制造商的商誉与零售商之间的广告竞争强度相关。